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COMMENTS
HOW FAR WILL MULTI-STATE DEATH TAXATION GO?
CURRY v. McCANLESS REVISITED
"Eighteen months ago, William K. Vanderbilt died and left an estate of
$35,000,000. It is now reported that federal taxes took $25,000,000 and New
York state taxes another $5,000,000, thus leaving $5,000,000 for the heir." '
This quotation, a news item from a leading American newspaper, serves only
to emphasize the extent to which our death 2 tax laws have gone in redistrib-
uting wealth. But, strange as it may seem, this is only a starting point of
the burdensome effect of death taxation, for the full impact of the burden
is realized only after one is confronted with the problem of multi-state death
taxation.
Suppose, for example, Vanderbilt had died in New York owning stock
of a corporation incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Tennessee. In such a situation all four states would have the right to im-
pose a death tax on the transfer of the stock. 3 Again, suppose Vanderbilt died
in New York owning a car which was kept in Tennessee. Could both New
York and Tennessee impose a death tax on the value of that car? Today, the
answer is no, only Tennessee may do so. Tomorrow, however, may bring a
different result.
It is the purpose of this comment to show how the death tax laws today
affect the estate of a person who dies in one state leaving tangible or intangible
personalty 4 in another state, and also to recall the laws as they existed in the
not too remote past and to surmise what they will be tomorrow in the light of
recent trends.
The "subject" of the death tax is said to be the privilege of transferring
1. N. Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1945.
2. The term "death" tax is used throughout this paper. States sometimes call these
taxes "inheritance" taxes, sometimes "estate" taxes. The Federal Government used to
have a federal inheritance tax-now called federal estate tax. The difference between the
two lies mainly in who pays what amount. In the case of an inheritance tax on a million
dollar estate left equally to ten different persons, each person would pay a tax on
$100,000, while in the case of an estate tax, the tax would be paid on the million dollars
prior to distribution, thus resulting in a larger tax.
3. See State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
4. That "tangible" may be a house. Or it may be a car. In fact, it may be any
number or variety of "things" which you or I can see and touch, like paintings or golf
clubs or books. The judges have called these things "tangibles"--tangible realty if a house
or land is what is left by the decedent, and tangible personalty if what is left is a car or
a ring. On the other hand, what the decedent leaves may be something we aren't sup-
posed to be able to see and touch, like stocks or bonds or contract rights, which the judges
have called "intangibles." Finally, there is a kind of no-man's land, an in between area
where certain things the decedent leaves are put because they can't be placed anywhere
else. When the decedent left a house, it fit like a round peg into a round hole-tangible
realty. And when he left a car and a bond, these round pegs were joyfully fitted into their
respective round tangible and intangible personalty holes. But the decedent might have
died owning certificates representing undivided shares of ownership in real property or a
seat on the stock exchange. These things look like realty but they also look like what the
judges called intangible personalty.
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property or the privilege of succeeding to it, but it is agreed that the tax is
not laid upon the property itself. However, the type of property transferred at
death determines whether the problem of multi-state taxation will come into
play.
ONE MAN-ONE ACRE-ONE TAX
If X dies in New York owning land in Tennessee, only Tennessee can
successfully impose a death tax based on the value of that land.5 The doctrine
that land or realty is taxable only by the state in which it is located has been
settled since the earliest cases and to this day remains unchallenged. However,
suppose X died in New York leaving land in Tennessee which he directs in his
will to be sold. Did X by directing the sale of that land in' his will "equitably
convert" the land into an intangible personalty? Certainly New York tax of-
ficials would argue for an affirmative answer to this question because the state
of the decedent's domicile can always impose a death tax unless the thing left
by the decedent is realty or tangible personalty. The case of In Matter of Es-
tate of Swift 6 raised the equitable conversion by will problem. X, living in
New York, died owning land in New Jersey. The executors sold this land
according to X's testamentary instructions. The New York court rejected the
conversion theory, declaring, "neither the doctrine of equitable conversion of
lands, nor any fiction of situs of movables, can have any bearing upon the
question under advisement." 7
Again, suppose X makes an executory contract for the sale of that land
but dies before the date of sale. Does the fact that he died leaving a contract
right mean that he died owning an intangible, thus allowing New York to
tax? The cases are rare and the question remains unanswered by the Supreme
Court; however, cases dealing with these no man's land situations have arisen
in the state courts. One such case, particularly interesting because of the
reasoning of both the majority and the dissent is the case of Paul's Estate.8
X, a decedent-resident of Pennsylvania, had entered into a contract to sell
some land he owned in New Jersey and Missouri, but died before the sale.
Could Pennsylvania impose a death tax? The majority said no, but the dis-
senting judge gave a convincing argument the other way. The contract right,
he argued, was an intangible and so subject to a death tax by X's home state
just as any other intangible. A similar argument could be employed in regard
to other no man's land situations
5. Louisville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903).
6. 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1893).
7. Id. at 86.
8. 303 Pa. 330, 154 At. 503 (1931).
9. Suppose, for example, X died a resident of Tennessee owning a share or certificate
in a trust of realty in New York; or had contracted to lease land there; or had a mortgage
on land there. The arguments in all but the last of these cases would run along much the
same lines as those in the equitable conversion by sale and by will problems. It seems, how-
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ONE MAN-ONE CAR-ONE TAx
If X dies a resident of New York, owning a car permanently kept in
Tennessee, only Tennessee can impose a death tax on the value of that car.
The rule that tangible personal property-a car, a watch, a ring--is subject to
death taxes only by the state where permanently kept, was announced ap-
proximately 20 years ago by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in the case of Frick
v. Pennsylvania."° Was this always the law? Certainly not. Before the Frick
case, it was assumed that the power of the decedent's domicil to impose the
tax extended to all personal property, tangible or intangible wherever located
and regardless of whether a similar tax was exacted by another state," This
doctrine of multi-state death taxation of all personal property received its
justification from the application of mutually inconsistent and antagonistic
principles. In order to allow the decedent's home state to impose a death tax
on personal property located outside of its borders, the fiction of inobilia se-
quuntur personain was applied, which when translated means, movables follow
the law of the person ;12 while the "'actual situs" of the property was given ef-
fect to justify the tax in states other than the decedent's domicil. The Frick
case modified the law in so far as it applied to tangibles by preventing the
application of the fiction inobilia sequucntur personam to support the exacting
of the tax by the state of the decedent's domicil.
In the Frick case, X died a resident of Pennsylvania leaving paintings
and other art treasures located in New York and Massachusetts. The United
States Supreme Court, in denying Pennsylvania the right to impose a death
tax, stated, "to impose [this tax] without such jurisdiction is mere extortion
and in contravention of due process of law. Here the tax was imposed on the
transfer of tangible personalty having an actual situs in other states-New
York and Massachusetts . . . True, its owner was domiciled in Pennsylvania
but this neither brought it under the jurisdiction of that state nor subtracted
anything from the jurisdiction of New York and Massachusetts. In these re-
ever, that in the mortgage situation both Tennessee and New York could successfully im-
pose death taxes, for the land, even though mortgaged, in no way lost its character as
realty. X still died owning land located in New York. He didn't direct its sale in his will,
nor had he entered into a contract to sell it, or own a share of it. He owned it-all of it,himself, and it was located in New York. That set of facts, under the law as laid down
from the earliest cases and unquestioned until the present day, should be sufficient to allow
New York to impose a death tax. But what about Tennessee? The mortgage was taken out
there; credit was given there with the land as security. Furthermore, Tennessee law al-
lowed X, its resident, to obtain the mortgage. It would seem that Tennessee also should be
allowed to impose a death tax. But this is only conjecture. The cases are rare, and the
questions unanswered by the Supreme Court. Cases dealing with these no-man's land
situations have, however, arisen in the state courts.
10. 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
11. In Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903) and Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S.
625 (1916) the Court observed arguendo that succession to tangible chattels may be taxed
wherever found and since the law of the situs accepts its rules of succession from the law
of domicil, the tangible is taxed again there.
12. STORY, CONFULICT OF LAWS § 378 (4th ed. 1852).
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spects, the situation was the same as if the property had been immovable re-
alty." 13 Thus, the still adhered to "one state death tax doctrine" was an-
nounced in regard to tangible personalty. Although it is difficult to reconcile
the doctrine announced in the Frick case with the theory that the subject of
death taxes is not the property itself but the privilege of disposing of it or of
succeeding to it, that decision brought about what is submitted as the desirable
result of obviating the injustice of "double taxation" as related to tangible per-
sonalty.
When the "One Man-One Car-One Tax" doctrine was announced in
the Frick case, the situs of the property was not in question. Suppose, how-
ever, X died owning a fleet of trucks which weren't permanently kept any-
where, but which moved from state to state delivering goods. Would all states
through which the trucks passed have the right to impose a death tax on the
value of those trucks? This type of problem has not faced the court in the
field of interstate death taxation. In the property tax field, however, the court
has allowed each state through which the trucks pass to use the "unit rule,"
under which these states can compute the average number of trucks always
moving within their boundaries and tax X on that basis as though the trucks
were permanently kept there.14
It is not the purpose of this comment to examine the law of property taxes
concerning objects which move from state to state, only to suggest that such
criteria might be carried over into the death tax field. The -death tax problem
as stated here remains unanswered, but the property tax rules are available
should the question arise. Whether or not these rules would be used by the
Court is an open question.
There is, however, a decision by the Court that is useful in determining
just what the word "permanent" means. In the Schnader case,' 5 the decedent,
a New York resident, had loaned his paintings to a museum in Pennsylvania.
They remained there until his death about two years later. Both states claimed
sufficient situs to impose a death tax, New York on the ground that although
the paintings were located in Pennsylvania at the time of the decedent's death,
they were only temporarily there, whereas Pennsylvania sought to impose a
death tax on the ground of permanent location as laid down in the Frick case.
The Court decided that the paintings had an "actual" situs in Pennsylvania
and therefore that the rule of the Frick case governed. Mr. Justice Butler,
delivering the opinion, observed, "For nearly two years next preceding his
death, Clarke was willing-indeed, he authorized the museum director-to
sell his collection. . . It does not appear that Clarke ever intended to have the
13. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 492 (1925).
14. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); American Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899).
15. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 (1934).
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pictures returned to New York... The location of the portraits in Pennsyl-
vania was not merely transitory or temporary but it was fixed in an established
abiding place in which they remained for a long time . . . By sending them
into Pennsylvania ... and his lack of definite intention ever to have them re-
turned to New York... Clarke failed to maintain an actual situs in New York
and created one for them in Pennsylvania. The principle applied in Frick v.
Pennsylvania governs.. " 16
What, then, are the implications of the Frick and Schnader cases, and what
is the "law" today when a man dies leaving a car in another state to somebody
else? The answer to the last part of this question has been obvious since the
Frick case-one man-one car--one tax, by the state where the car is per-
manently kept. But the first part of the question poses another question-
when is the rule in the Frick case to be applied? In short, when is an object
"permanently kept" in a state so as to give that state sufficient situs to im-
pose a death tax?
First of all, nine times out of ten the state where the car or ring or other
tangible is found at the time of the owner's death is the state where the ob-
ject is permanently kept, thus allowing only that state to collect a death tax.
Situations like this would arise when X, living in Minnesota, kept cattle at
all times in Missouri or kept jewelry at all times in a safe deposit box in
Kansas.
Even in cases where there is some doubt as to the "actual situs" of the
object, there is at least a presumption that the state where the object is found
is the state of permanent location. What can overcome that presumption? In
the Schnader case two factors were stressed-intention and length of time.
Although intention, or rather the lack of it, is mentioned several times in the
decision, ("It does not appear that Clarke ever intended ... "; "his lack of
definite intention to do so"), the real basis of the opinion seems to be "actual
situs" as determined by length of time, ("not merely transient, transitory or
temporary... fixed in an established abiding place in which they remained for
a long time"). 17
In other words, had Clarke sent the paintings to the Pennsylvania museum
only a few days or weeks before his death, the decision might have gone the
other way-no "actual situs." But where is the dividing line? Would one year
have been long enough? Six months? The judges, even the same judges, might
differ according to the facts of the individual case.
Coupled with length of time are intention and purpose. Did X ever intend
to bring his car back to his home state? And for what purpose did he send it
into another state? The writer believes that even though Clarke, in the
16. Id. at"119, 120, 121.
17. Id. at 120.
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Schlader case, had intended to bring the paintings back to his domiciliary state
at some future time, that fact alone would not have been enough to keep the
"actual situs" in his home state. He left the paintings in Pennsylvania for too
long a period and his purpose in so doing was to put them on exhibition for
sale.
Suppose that X sent a diamond brooch to another state for repairs and
that it took the jeweler two years to obtain the proper parts, X dying at the
end of that time but before the brooch was returned. Here, although the
length of time approximated that in the Schnader case, there was a definite
intention to have the brooch returned and the purpose was not for the dis-
posal of the object but rather for its repair. It seems that even Mr. Justice
Butler would have denied an "actual situs" in the jewelry store state.in such
a case. These factors then, length of time, intention, and purpose, with em-
phasis on the first, seem to be the governing criteria in deciding which of two
statts has sufficient situs to impose a death tax when a man dies in one state
owning an object found in another state.
ONE MAN-ONE BOND-MoRE THAN ONE TAX
Although the Supreme Court invalidated multiple state death taxation
of tangible property, it did not immediately follow suit with respect to in-
tangibles, the avowed reason being the lack of any "actual situs." However,
before the law of multi-state taxation of intangibles was announced, it wit-
nessed an era of successful opposition. In the case of Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota,'s the right of the state to impose a death
tax by virtue of the domicil of the debtor was denied. X, a New York decedent,
died owning bonds issued by the state of Minnesota and by certain munic-
ipal corporations, which bonds were kept in New York. Minnesota was de-
nied the right to impose a death tax and New York was granted the exclusive
right to do so. Mr. Justice McReynolds, delivering the majority opinion,
stated, "We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly taxed
at the domicile of their owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying
that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than
one place similar to that accorded to tangibles. The difference between the
two things, although obvious enough, seems insufficient to justify the harsh
and oppressive discrimination against intangibles contended for on behalf of
Minnesota." "9 Mr. Justice McReynolds had the obstacle of Blackstone v.
Miller2 0 to hurdle, which hurdle he managed to jump only by delving into
the social and economic' maladjustments that would result from multi-state
18. 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
19. Id. at 212.
20. 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
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taxation, observing, "Blackstone v. Miller ... lends support to the doctrine
that ordinarily choses in action are subject to taxation both at the debtor's
domicile and at the domicile of the creditor; that two States may tax on differ-
ent and more or less inconsistent principles the same testamentary transfer of
such property without conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. The inevitable
tendency of that view is to disturb good relations among the States and pro-
duce the kind of discontent expected to subside after the establishment of the
Union ... Blackstone v. Miller no longer can be regarded as a correct expo-
sition of existing law; and to prevent misunderstanding it is definitely over-
ruled." 21 Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the decision but on a different basis.
He asserted that multi-state taxation in itself was not necessarily in contra-
vention of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, before a state can impose a
death tax, thought Stone, it must have jurisdiction. In the case at bar, he added,
though the contract fransferred was called into existence by the law of Min-
nesota, its obligations could not be constitutionally impaired or withdrawn from
the protection which those laws gave it at its inception. 22
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, long time ardent advo-
cates of commonsense constitutional interpretation, dissented. The dissenting
view is worthy of note, particularly since it reflects the majority opinion in a
subsequent case establishing the present day multi-state taxation law of in-
tangibles. Holmes proclaimed, "No one would doubt that the law of Min-
nesota was necessary to call the obligation into existence ... It seems to me
that it is the law of Minnesota alone that keeps the debt alive... Blackstone
v. Miller ... supports my conclusion and I do not think it should be overruled.
A good deal has to be read into the Fourteenth Amendment to give it any bear-
ing upon this case. The Amendment does not condemn everything that we
may think undesirable on economic or social grounds." 2 3 The one intangible-
one death tax doctrine gradually lost recognition in the light of growing ac-
ceptance of this dissenting view until 1939, when it was definitely overthrown
by Curry v. McCanless.24
A decedent resident of Tennessee had created a trust of intangibles re-
serving control over the income for life and power to revoke the trust by will.
The trust was administered in Alabama by a trustee incorporated under the
laws of that state. At her death, her executors brought suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment to determine liability of the trust estate for death taxes. On
appeal from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to adhere to the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited multi-state taxation of intangibles, and by permitting both
21. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209 (1930).
22. Id. at 214.
23. Id. at 217, 218.
24. 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
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states to exact the tax, subscribed to the view that protection and benefit are
together the only test of a state's jurisdiction to tax. The decision was rendered
by a 5-4 vote, with the dissenters arguing that since the trust property was
never in Tennessee and since the trustee was domiciled in Alabama and ad-
ministered the trust there, it became localized in Alabama, resulting in a
lack of the situs necessary to give Tennessee jurisdiction to exact the tax.
Now it is to be remembered that the state of domicil here was Tennessee.
It is also to be remembered that during the preceding one intangible-one
state;-one tax period, the domiciliary state was selected as the state of situs
for death tax purposes and that state alone could collect the tax. Wasn't it
odd, then, that the dissenters in the Curry case argued that Alabama, not the
state of the decedent's domicil, was the only state which should be permitted
to tax? Not at all, because Alabama was the state of legal domicil. In other
words, when the decedent set up a trust in Alabama, she transferred the legal
title to the stocks and bonds to the trustee there.
But how about the due process and "actual situs" arguments? The Curry
case was the beginning of the end of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an effective argument against multi-state death taxation of
intangibles: ". . . we think that neither reason nor authority requires its ac-
ceptance in the circumstances of the present case... it is difficult to see how it
could be said . . . upon what articulate principle the Fourteenth Amendment
could be thought to have withdrawn from either state the taxing jurisdiction
which it undoubtedly possessed before the adoption of the Amendment by
conferring on one state, at the expense of the other, exclusive jurisdiction to
tax. . If the 'due process' of the Fifth Amendment does not require us to fix
a single exclusive place of taxation of intangibles for the benefit of their
foreign owner, who is entitled to its protection... the Fourteenth can hardly
be thought to make us do so here.. ." 25
Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote these words, was referring to the earlier
case of Burnett v. Brooks2 6 In that case, X, a British subject, died domiciled
in England owning British government bonds, bonds of several of the states of
the United States, and bonds and stocks of a corporation organized under
the laws of State Y. All of these securities were in the possession of Z, a
United States resident who collected the income and deposited it in a New
York bank to X's credit. Could the United States include these securities in
X's gross estate when computing the federal estate tax? The Court said yes--
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply. Thus the Curry
case, where two states were involved, saw Mr. Justice Stone refusing to apply
25. Id. at 363, 369.
26. 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
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the Fourteenth Amendment just as the Court bad refused to apply the Fifth
Amendment where two nations were involved.
There remained the "actual situs" argument raised by the dissenters-
that since the trust property was completely localized in Tennessee, only Ten-
nessee should be allowed to impose a death tax. Mr. Justice Stone and the
majority were quick to knock down this argument, countering with what has
been called the "benefit and protection" theory, a theory that was to become
the big stick in all subsequent multi-state death tax cases. In applying this doc-
trine the Court reasoned that when the settlor set up a trust in a state other
than her domiciliary state she created two sets of legal relationships, one the
legal ownership in the Alabama trustee and the other her equitable right to
control the action of the trustee with respect to the trust property and to
compel him to pay over the income during her life, and her power to dispose of
the property at death. The legal ownership of the stocks and bonds by the
Alabama trustee gave Alabama the right to impose a death tax, while the fact
of domicil accompanied by equitable control gave Tennessee that right also.
Mr. Justice Stone pointed to Bulen v. Wisconsin.2 7 In that case, X, a dece-
dent resident of Wisconsin, had placed stocks and bonds in trust with a trustee
in Illinois, retaining income for life, power to revoke the trust, and the right
to control the disposition of the principal and income at- his death. Wisconsin
was allowed to impose a death tax as well as Illinois. The same death tax
rights, said Mr. Justice Stone, existed in the Curry situation.
Furthermore, said Stone, it is foolish to attempt to ascribe a "fictitious
situs" in a single state to intangibles despite the multiple legal interests to
which they may give rise. The decedent here had the duty to contribute to the
support of the government of her home state. In return she received the bene-
fit and protection of its laws. Similarly, this benefit and protection existed in
Alabama, the state where the trust was created. By extending her activities
into that state she availed herself of the benefit and protection of Alabama
laws. "Protection, benefit, and power over the subject matter are not confined
to either state." 28
What did the Curry case mean? First, the Fourteenth Amendment was
negatived as an effective argument against multi-state death taxation of in-
tangibles. If there was any doubt about this, it was soon dispelled in a subse-
quent case.29 Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion, cited the Curry case
in knocking down the due process argument.
Secondly, the benefit and protection theory was here and here to stay.
No longer was the state of legal domicil, or what has been called the state of
"trust situs" the only state that could tax. On the contrary, in a trust situation
27. 240 U. S. 625 (1916).
28. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 365, 368 (1939).
29. Central Hanover Bank v. Kelly, 319 U. S. 94 (1943). (See Chart)
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both states could impose a death tax; both give benefit and protection for which
they are justly due a return.
How far would the new doctrine be carried? The Curry case was a trust
situation, but there were strong words in the opinion which foretold the shape
of things to come-words such as "Shares of corporate stock may be taxed at
the domicile of the shareholder and also at that of the corporation which the
taxing state has created and controls. . . ." 30
One aspect of Mr. Justice Stone's opinion stood out prominently, es-
pecially to.the dissenters, particularly to Mr. Justice Hughes, who rapped it
convincingly in another case decided on the same day-the Elliott case.31
Mr. Justice Stone had been very careful to reflect the difference between tangi-
bles and intangibles as far as multi-state death taxation was concerned. "Very
different considerations, both theoretical and practical, apply to the taxation of
intangibles . . ." 3 Tangibles, he said, like cars, are located in a single place,
thus only that place can tax at death. Not'so with intangibles, which can have
no situs, and are not localized. These statements were the basis for Mr. Justice
Hughes' attack which was launched in a dissenting opinion in the Elliott case
while arguing for a one state death tax for intangibles.
X, a resident of State A, had transferred bonds to a State A trustee, the
income to be paid to Y and Z, X retaining until his death the right to revoke
the trust. X moved to State B and died a resident there. Could both States A
and B impose a death tax? The court said yes, again by a 5-4 vote, the ma-
jority basing the decision squarely on the Curry holding and its reasoning.
Mr. Justice Hughes in his dissenting opinion, declared, ". . the legal title
to the property in question is in a Colorado (State A) trustee, the trust was
created under the Colorado law and its administration is subject to the control
of Colorado. To say that these securities are not as effectively localized in
Colorado, as were the furniture, pictures and other art treasures of Mr. Frick
in New York and Massachusetts, where alone their transfer could be taxed,
would be to ignore realities and to make important rights turn upon a verbal
distinction." 33
Thus, Mr. Justice Hughes' challenge to the tangible-intangible distinc-
tion'raised the question, does an adequate distinction exist between tangibles
and intangibles to justify the imposition of inconsistent death tax laws? If
not, which of the two antagonistic principles, "actual situs" or inobilia se-
quitntur personam, should prevail as a uniform death tax treatment of all per-
sonalty, tangible and intangible? The answers will be arrived at through
practical considerations rather than through theoretical reasonings.
"30. See note 28 supra.
31. Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939).
32. 307 U. S. 357, 365 (1939).
33. Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 391 (1939).
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The Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide these questions in the
case of Pearsm v. McGraw.3 4 X, a resident of State A, moved to State B
but left securities with a trustee domiciled in State A. Admittedly in contem-
plation of death, he directed the trustee to sell the securities and to buy federal
reserve notes and with the proceeds to purchase more securities. The reason
for this transaction was obvious, for if X died having created a trust of in-
tangibles (the securities) in another state, that other state and X's home state
would both have the right to impose a death tax on the value of those intan-
gibles. But if X created a trust of tangibles (federal notes) in another state,
the one state tax doctrine announced in the Frick case would prevail. The
Court, without deciding the nature of federal reserve notes, granted both states
the right to impose a death tax. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion for
the majority, declared, ". . . the various steps in the series must be considered
as constituting but one integrated and indivisible transaction-a transfer by
decedent of intangibles in contemplation of death." 35 Mr. Justice Stone was
not satisfied with this dismissal of the case, asserting in his concurring opinion
that the court shirked the "duty of deciding the only federal question which
could by any possibility be said to be raised by the record, namely, whether
the Constitution precludes taxation of the gift of the banknotes merely be-
cause of the physical fact that they are located without the state." 36 Mr. Jus-
tice Stone didn't decide, as some writers have asserted, whether the federal
reserve notes were tangibles or intangibles.3 7 What he did say was, ". .. I am
of the opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution to compel a state to
treat federal reserve notes for tax purposes as chattels were treated'in Frick
v. Pennsylvania. . ." 3
The answer to the query of how far the benefit and protection theory
would be carried was not far away. The Curry and Elliott cases were both
situations in which the state where the trust was set up and the state of the
donor's domicil each tried to impose death taxes and were allowed to do so.
A few years later, in the case of Graves v. Schmidlapp,39 the state of the
donee's domicil and the state where the trust was created tried to impose
death taxes. X, a decedent resident of State A, had created a trust of securities
in State A, giving to Y, a resident of State B, a power of appointment over
the trust property. Y died a resident of State B where his will was probated,
having named the successor. Could both States A and B impose a death tax
in such a situation? About twenty years previously, in Wachovia Bank &
34. 308 U. S. 313 (1939).
35. Id. at 317.
36. Id. at 319.
37. Brown, Multiple Taxation of Intangibles, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 806 (1942).
38. 308 U. S. 313, 320 (1939).
39. 315 U. S. 657 (1942).
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Trust Co. v. Doughton,40 the Court had said no under a similar set of facts.
State A, Yes, not because X had lived there but because the trust was created
there. State B, No, because there was "insufficient situs" there for the impo-
sition of a death tax. The fact that State B happened to be Y's state of domicil
was immaterial. Furthermore, said that Court, although there was a power
of appointment involved, the exercise of that power would have been effected
regardless of the laws of State B, where Y died, for the exercise of the power
depended not upon the laws of that state but upon the lawg of State A, where
the trust was set up. But the benefit and protection doctrine was already deep-
ly imbedded and the Wachovia case was specifically overruled. Here again
there was no argument about the right of State A, the "trust situs" state, to
tax. State A was like Alabama in the Curry case and like Colorado in the
Elliott case. The only question was-could State B, the state of Y's domicil,
impose a death tax also. In saying yes, the court through Mr. Justice Stone
once more made use of the benefit and protection theory. The fact that Y, the
donee, was domiciled in State B was alone enough to allow that state to tax
-since the domiciliary state afforded benefit and tirotection to the decedent.
In answer to the Wachovia argument that only the law of the state where the
trust was created determines whether the power has been validly exercised,
Mr. Justice Stone said, that may be true, but the law of the donee's domicil
also made a contribution, for the will of the donee was probated and given
effect in State B. State B thus gave something for which it could ask a return
-the death tax.
The next extension of the Curry rule came before the court in the case of
State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich.41 X died a resident of State A,
owning stocks of corporations incorporated under the laws of State B. The
stock certificates had always been kept by X in State A. The corporation, the
Union Pacific, had always kept its stock books, records and transfer agents in
State A. Could both States A and B impose a death tax? Put another way, can
the state of incorporation impose a death tax on the shares of a non-resident
decedent? The answer to this question could have been predicted from a read-
ing of the Curry case, when Mr. justice Stone went out of his way to say
(though perhaps he wasn't referring specifically to death taxes): "Shares
of corporate stock may be taxed at the domicile of the shareholder and also at
that of the corporation which the taxing state has created and controls." 42
And this was precisely the way the Aldrich case was decided, Mr. Justice
Douglas writing the majority opinion. The Aldrich case, too, had a predeces-
sor, the case of First National Bank v. Maine.43 That case saw the State of
40. 272 U. S. 567 (1926).
41. 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
42. 307 U. S. 357, 368 (1939).
43. 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
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Maine attempting to collect a death tax on the transfer of stocl of a corpora-
tion incorporated under the laws of Maine. This stock was owned by a Mas-
sachusetts resident. The Court denied Maine the right to tax, declaring, "...
shares of stock, like the other intangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a
death transfer tax by one state only... [the state of domicil]." '4 The Court
again went into the social and economic desirability factors, discussing the
"desirability for uniform rules" and "reciprocal inheritance statutes." How-
ever, the Maine case was decided before the adoption of the benefit and pro-
tection doctrine, and the Aldrich case specifically overruled it. Utah, said Mr.
Justice Douglas, gave the Union Pacific its very existence; it affords protection
to the shareholder's rights and it has power over the transfer by the corpora-
tion of its shares of stock--"Certainly that protection, benefit, and-power over
the shares would have satisfied the test of Blackstone v. Miller and Curry v.
McCanless." 45
Apart from the holding itself, there is contained in the opinion one passage
that represents the way Justices Douglas, Black and others feel about
multistate taxation: ". .. even though we believed that a different system
should be designed to protect against multiple taxation, it is not our province
to provide it." 46 Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a long and vigorous dissent de-
daring, "I. . . take today's decision to mean that any State may lay substantial-
ly any tax on any transfer of intangible property toward which it can spell
out a conceivable legal relationship... And since the Due Process Clause speaks
with no more clarity as to tangibles than as to intangible property, the question
is opened whether our decisions as to the taxation Of tangible property are
44. Id. at 328.
45. 316 U. S. 174, 180 (1942).
46. Id. at 181. The necessity for this judicial nudging of Congress to do something to
correct the evils of multi-state death taxation is still further emphasized when one examines
the so-called "double domicil" cases. In Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939), the de-
cedent died in New York but had moved from place to place during his life. He had a hotel
room in New York, a winter home in Florida, a rented room in Texas, and a large home
in Massachusetts. All of these states claimed a right to impose a death tax on the basis of
domicil. Their claims plus the federal estate tax exceeded the value of the estate. The Court
has refused to take jurisdiction in all previous double domicil cases, but did so in this in-
stance under the provisions of Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution. An appointed special master
found that the decedent was domiciled in Mass. at the time of his death. This report and
the master's findings were accepted by the Court, which said, in effect, this man had only
one domicil-Mass., and only Mass. could impose a death tax. The inability of the estate
to answer all claims required the exercise of the Court's equitable jurisdiction.
In Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939), which was not strictly a double
domicil case, the Court refused to accept jurisdiction since the estate was capable of satis-
fying all death tax claims. (X, domiciled in Mass., died leaving an estate there of $12,000.
While living in Mass., X had created trusts aggregrating over two million dollars with
Missouri trustees. Massachusetts and Missouri had reciprocal exemption tax laws by which
intangibles of a non-resident decedent were exempted from taxes for so long as the state
of the decedent's domicil did not attempt to impose such a tax on intangibles owned by
residents of the other state. Missouri, however, tried to impose a death tax despite this
reciprocal agreement. Mass. asked the Court to take jurisdiction on the basis of its decision
in the case of Texas v. Florida, but the Court refused to do so because of the lack of mu- 9
tually exclusive claims.)
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not due to be overhauled." 47 In effect, Mr. justice Jackson asked, if the
Curry doctrine is to be extended this far, shouldn't it be extended to include
tangible personalty? Before attempting to answer that question, what was the
full significance of the Aldrich decision?
The Maine case was specifically overruled. Today, if X dies a resident
of State A, owning stocks of forty-seven different corporations incorporated
under the laws of forty-seven different states, all of the forty-seven different
states, if they choose to do so, can impose a death tax as based on the value of
the stock of that corporation which they chartered. And the state of domicil,
State A, can impose a death tax based on the entire value of all forty-seven
stocks. Such an example is unlikely to occur, but it is "the law" today.
Does the Aldrich case mean that if X died a resident of State A, owning
stocks and bonds of a corporation incorporated under the laws of State A
and kept at all times by X in a safety deposit box in a State B bank that State
B can impose a death tax on the value of those stocks and bonds? Some writers
point to the Aldrich case in answering this question in the affirmative. How-
ever, a careful examination of that case calls for an opposite conclusion, for
it was stated, "In case of shares of stock, 'jurisdiction to tax' is not restricted to
the domiciliary State. Another State which has extended benefits or protection,
or which can denwnstrate, the practical fact of its power, or sovereignty as re-
spects the shares... may likewise constitutionally make its exaction." 48 [Italics
added]
In other words, the mere fact that I die a resident of California, owning
shares of stock which I have buried in a tin box in the ground across the line
in Arizona, doesn't entitle Arizona to impose a death tax based on the value
of those shares. Similarly, in the safe deposit box example, where the shares
lie idly, the paper evidences in another state mean nothing. The state attempt-
ing to collect a death tax must have some plain connection of a substantial
nature with the subject of the tax.
Is the fact that a corporation does business in a state enough to create
the legal relationship necessary to allow that state to impose a death tax?
Suppose, for example, that X dies in Missouri owning stocks of Missouri cor-
porations which do business in seven other states. Can those seven states im-
pose a death tax? About twenty years ago, the case of Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Doughton 49 presented a somewhat similar problem. North Caro-
lina attempted to impose a death tax on the transfer of stock of an out-of-
state corporation by an out-of-state resident. The tax, however, was not based
on the amount of business transacted by the corporation in North Carolina
but rather at that proportion of their actual value which the corporate assets
47. 316 U. S. 174, 201 (1942).
48. Id. at 181, 182.
49. 270 U. S. 69 (1926).
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in North Carolina bore to the total corporate assets. The stockholder, said the
Court, didn't own the property in North Carolina-it belonged to the corpora-
tion. Therefore, jurisdiction to tax cannot be made to rest upon the situs of
part of the corporate property in the state. Nor did the shareholders subject
their stock to the taxing jurisdiction of North Carolina by the company's do-
ing business there.
Thus, although the tax in the Rhode Island Hospital case was based on
the proportionate amount of property owned by the corporation in North
Carolina and not on the amount of business done there, the wording of the
opinion, as well as the subsequent single state death tax cases made it clear
that even on a doing business basis, a death tax wouldn't succeed. Has the pic-
ture changed since? Although the issue hasn't squarely faced the Court, it is
submitted that the application of the benefit and protection doctrine calls only
for an affirmative answer. The state where the corporation does business
grants numerous privileges to the corporation and after all, the stockholder
is a part owner of the corporation who benefits when it benefits. ,
The impracticability of such a method of obtaining revenue, however,
seems to make it unlikely that the states would resort to such means. Picture
a long list of securities left by a dying man. Each state would have to com-
pute for each share of stock left by every decedent just how much business
was done within its borders by the issuing corporation. However, it is within
the province of each state to do so.
The adoption and extension of the benefit and protection doctrine makes
it apparent, in the opinion of the writer, that the Court is getting nearer and
nearer to saying outright-one man--one car-more than one tax. That was
the law prior to the Frick case, the start of the single death tax doctrine. Then
came the Curry case, which established a distinction between tangibles and in-
tangibles for the purpose of applying death tax laws by invoking the benefit
and protection doctrine to intangibles. The Elliott, Schmnidlapp and Aldrich
cases followed, extending the benefit and protection doctrine still further. Do
these cases mean that more than one state can also tax tangibles? The Court
has not yet faced the problem squarely, but a strong argument can be made
that way. Under the reasoning of the benefit and protection theory, the owner
of the car, ring or painting is given the privilege, in his domiciliary state, of
contracting for the sale of these objects and of transferring title to them in
any other way. Thus, even though those objects have a permanent situs in
another state, benefit and protection are given by the home state.
The attitude of the present Court in this regard is reflected in an exami-
nation of the language used in two recent personal property tax cases. In the
case of Greenough v. Tax Assessors,"° X died a resident of New York. He
50. Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 67 Sup. Ct. 1400 (1947).
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created a testamentary trust of intangibles, the evidences of which were located
wholly within New York, and appointed two trustees to carry out the pro-
visions. One trustee and the life beneficiary were residents of New York and
the other trustee a resident of Rhode Island. Under a Rhode Island statute,
a personal property tax was levied against the resident trustee upon Y of
the total value of the trust corpus, although the trustee did not exercise any of
his trust powers in Rhode Island. The estate contended that the tax could not
be assessed by virtue of the trustee's residence only and that since the state of
Rhode Island did not give benefit and protection to the trust wholly beyond its
jurisdiction, the statute as applied to this case was unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote upheld the tax and declared through Mr.
Justice Reed, ". . . When testamentary trustees reside outside of the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state of the seat of the trust, third parties dealing with the
trustee on trust matters or beneficiaries may need to proceed directly against the
trustee as an individual for matters arising out of his relation to the trust. Or
the resident trustee may need the benefit of the Rhode Island law to enforce
trust claims against a Rhode Island resident." 51 Thus the benefit and pro-
tection doctrine was employed to uphold a tax imposed by a state by virtue of
the benefit and protection it has made available to its residents, the fact that
the resident trustee in this case did not enjoy the benefits on behalf of the trust
estate being immaterial. This holding seems to be in, accord with Mr. justice
* Jackson's dissent in the Aldrich case. What is the justification for this broad
extension of the benefit and protection doctrine? The Court justified it as
follows, ..."When the taxpayer's wealth is represented by intangibles the
tax gatherer has difficulty in locating them and there is uncertainty as to which
taxing district affords benefits or protection to the actual property that the in-
tangibles represent." 52 If this reason is a sufficient basis for multi-state tax-
ation of intangibles, would tangibles be treated likewise if the actual situs
could not be definitely determined as in the case of vehicles in continual tran-
sit? According to Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota r the answer is yes.
A commercial airline, incorporated under the laws of Minnesota and
carrying on its activities through the Northwestern States, established St.
Paul, Minnesota as its principal place of business. In 1939, all of its planes had
been in Minnesota sometime or other, but none for the entire year. Some
states in which the air activities were conducted levied a personal property tax
on a proportionate part of the total number of planes and Minnesota sought to
levy a property tax on the entire fleet. The majority of the Court, 5-4, in up-
holding the tax, declared through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "The relation
between Northwest [the airline company] and Minnesota, a relation existing
51. Id. at 1405.
52. Id. at 1403.
53. 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
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between no other state and Northwest, and the benefits which this relation
affords are the constitutional foundation for the taxing power which Minne-
sota has asserted." 54 The majority expressly refrained from making a com-
mitment regarding the right of the other states to impose a tax on the same
planes taxed by Minnesota. By the Court's very refusal to so commit itself, the
deeply imbedded doctrine announced in the Frick case becomes questionable,
particularly since the ever-popular benefit and protection doctrine has invaded
the field of tangibles, superseding the "actual situs" argument. In the light of
the language used by the Court, it appears as though the benefit and protec-
tion doctrine will be applied to justify the exacting of a death tax on tangibles
by more than one state when the problem squarely faces the Court. Constitu-
tionally, there is nothing to prevent it, since no valid distinction exists between
tangibles and intangibles to justify the apiplication of antagonistic principles.
Death tax laws have undergone an evolution, and, as usual, the judges
have made the changes. What was true the day before yesterday was not true
yesterday. And what was the law yesterday is not the law today. Tomorrow
may see still more changes. The writer has prepared a death tax chart, placed
on the succeeding pages, which he submits as an aid to the attorney who is
faced with a multi-state death tax problem under the law as it is today.
THOMAS A. THOMAS
54. Id. at 294.
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